| McDonnell Douglas v. Green | ||||||
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Supreme Court of the United States |
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| Argued March 28, 1973 Decided May 14, 1973 |
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| Full case name | ' | |||||
| Prior history | On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit | |||||
| Court membership | ||||||
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| Case opinions | ||||||
| Majority | Powell | |||||
| Dissent | none | |||||
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), was an early substantive ruling by the United States Supreme Court regarding the burdens and nature of proof in proving a Title VII case and the order in which plaintiffs and defendants present proof. It was the seminal case in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a United States federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. After the Supreme Court ruling, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166) amended several sections of Title VII.[1]
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal government agency mandated under Title VII and other laws to process employment discrimination claims. A plaintiff in any lawsuit filed in federal court alleging unlawful employment discrimination must have received a letter from the EEOC granting the right to sue. This letter is obtained if the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the act of discrimination (or 300 days in certain cases when the complaint is filed with the state agency tasked to handle violations of state law). [2]
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination "because of" certain reasons. While "because of" may be understood in the conversational sense, the McDonnell Douglas case was the first landmark case to define this phrase.
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McDonnell Douglas was an aerospace company in St. Louis at the time of the lawsuit, but has since been acquired by Boeing. Percy Green was a black mechanic and laboratory technician laid off by McDonnell Douglas in 1964 during a reduction in force at the company.
Green, a long-time activist in the civil rights movement, protested that his discharge was racially motivated. He and others used cars to block roads to McDonnell Douglas factories. On one occasion, someone used a chain to lock the front door of a McDonnell Douglas downtown business office, preventing employees from leaving, though it was not certain whether Green was responsible.
Soon after the locked-door incident, McDonnell Douglas advertised for vacant mechanic positions, for which Green was qualified. Green was not hired, McDonnell Douglas citing his participation in blocking traffic and chaining the building.
Green subsequently filed a complaint with the EEOC, sued in U.S. District Court, and later appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit before the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
The Court wrote:
1. A complainant's right to bring suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not confined to charges as to which the EEOC has made a reasonable-cause finding, and the District Court's error in holding to the contrary was not harmless since the issues raised with respect to 703 (a) (1) were not identical to those with respect to 704 (a) and the dismissal of the former charge may have prejudiced respondent's efforts at trial.
2. In a private, non-class-action complaint under Title VII charging racial employment discrimination, the complainant has the burden of establishing a prima facie case, which he can satisfy by showing that (i) he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) he applied and was qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill; (iii) though qualified, he was rejected; and (iv) thereafter the employer continued to seek applicants with complainant's qualifications.
3. Here, the Court of Appeals, though correctly holding that respondent proved a prima facie case, erred in holding that petitioner had not discharged its burden of proof in rebuttal by showing that its stated reason for the rehiring refusal was based on respondent's illegal activity. But on remand respondent must be afforded a fair opportunity of proving that petitioner's stated reason was just a pretext for a racially discriminatory decision, such as by showing that whites engaging in similar illegal activity were retained or hired by petitioner. Other evidence that may be relevant, depending on the circumstances, could include facts that petitioner had discriminated against respondent when he was an employee or followed a discriminatory policy toward minority employees. [3]
The third point of the Court's decision is the reason for the significance of this case. The McDonnell Douglas case established the order and framework that employment discrimination cases must follow:
1. The plaintiff (employee) must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
2. The defendant (employer) must produce evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its actions. If this occurs, then the presumption of discrimination dissipates.
3. The plaintiff must then present facts to show an inference of discrimination. The plaintiff may do so either by showing that the defendant’s explanation is insufficient and only a pretext for discrimination or by otherwise proving that the defendant's actions used one of the listed unlawful discriminatory parameters.
In practice, the third step is the most difficult step for plaintiffs to achieve successfully.
The significance of this case is that it allows the plaintiff (employee) to shift the questions to be proved from whether the defendant has acted “because of” an unlawful discriminatory factor to whether the defendant has lied about the reasons it took action.
Since its issuance in 1973, all the federal courts have subsequently adopted the order and allocation of proof set out in McDonnell Douglas for all claims of disparate-treatment employment discrimination that are not based on direct evidence of discriminatory intent. [4]
As for the impact of the case on the original plaintiff and defendant, the case was remanded (sent back) to the District Court to adjudicate the case in compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling.